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APPLICABILITY OF LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS TO DETERMINE STOCK-
HOLDERS' LIABILITY FOR CORPORATION DEBTS
It is asserted by the text-writers with complete unanimity that
the individual liability of stockholders for corporation debts is
to be determined exclusively by the law of the state of incorpora-
tion.' The multitudinous cases commonly cited for this proposi-
tion seem, however, entirely inadequate to sustain it.2 For in these
cases, with only one or two exceptions,3 the only point squarely
presented to the court was whether a non-resident stockholder
was liable under the law of the place of incorporation; and there
was nothing to show that the place of incorporation was not
also the place where the corporation debt was contracted.
I Beale, Foreign Corporations, sec. 442. "In all these cases the existence
of the obligation is to be determined by the law of the State of charter.
That law creates the obligation, and that alone can determine what liability
it has created."
2 Professor W. N. Hohfeld, The Individual Liability of Stockholders
and the Conflict of Laws, IO COL. L. REV. 294, n. 24
S Hutchins v. New England Coal Mining Co. (1862) 4 Allen (Mass.)
58o; analyzed and explained, 10 COL. L. REV. 532.
[143]
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More recently, however, this problem has been defintely raised
in a series of important decisions4 growing out of the California
statute5 declaring every stockholder of a corporation, "domestic"
or "foreign," individually liable for his proportionate share of
the debts and liabilities of the corporation. The case of Provident
Gold Mining Co. v. Haynes8 is an interesting and important
extension of this series of cases. A corporation was formed in
Arizona for the purpose of doing business in Arizona or in any
other state or territory at the discretion of the board of directors.
The corporation incurred debts in California; and the defendant,
a California stockholder, was held individually liable even though
by the Arizona law the liability of the stockholders was expressly
limited.7
The first case under the California statute was Pinney v.
Nelson.8 A corporation was formed in Colorado with only
limited liability of stockholders as provided by the Colorado law.
By the express terms of the charter, the corporation could do
business in California. Business was done in that state; and the
court held that the stockholder became bound by the laws of the
state specifically mentioned in the charter; that he would be held
individually liable for his proportionate share of the debts of the
corporation according to the California statute.
In the next important case of the series, Thomas v. Mathies-
sen,9 the defendant, a citizen of New York and a stockholder in
an Arizona corporation, was at all times, as he alleged, without
knowledge of the California statute. The corporation having
been specifically authorized by the articles to do business in
California as well as elsewhere, constructed a hotel and in con-
nection therewith contracted debts in that state. The case differed
from Pinney v. Nelson in that (I) the articles of incorporation
4 Pinney v. Nelson (19Oi) 183 U. S. 144; Peck v. Noee (19o8) 154 Cal.
35,; Thomas v. Wentworth Hotel Co. (igio) x58 Cal. 275; Thomas v.
Mathiessen (914) 232 U. S. 221. In these cases the California statute
was held valid and applicable. Contra, Risdon Iron and Locomotive
Works v. Furness [igi6] i K. B. 49.
5 Const. art. xii, see. 3; Civ. Code, sec. 322.
6 (1916) 159 Cal. 155.
7 "The private property of every stockholder in the corporation shall
be forever exempt from liability for the corporate debts of the corpora-
tion."
8 (i9oi) 183 U. S., I44.
9 (1914) 232 U. S., 22I.
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as well as the state law expressly provided for limitation of the
stockholders' liability; (2) the defendant was not a citizen and
a resident of the state of incorporation or of California; (3)
the action was brought in the federal court of New York instead
of the California courts. Both the United States District Court o
and the Circuit Court of Appeals" held that, in spite of the
evident intention of the Colifornia statute, the defendant could
not be made liable thereby; but the Supreme Court, reversing
the lower courts' decision, held the defendant stockholder liable
for his proportionate share of the corporation debts.
It is but a step forward to the problem of the principal case.
The corporation was organized in Arizona to do business in that
state or "in any other state or territory as the board of directors
may from time to time deem necessary and expedient." Although
California was not mentioned in the articles of incorporation
as in the previous cases, a general authorization to do business
in the state was given and the court held the defendant for his
share of the corporation debts. This is in conflict with Risdon
Iron and Locomotive Works v. Furness12 decided by the English
-Court of Appeal. This case was, however, seriously criticized
in a series of articles appearing at the time,13 and it was main-
tained in the latter that the analogies and authorities as a whole
supported the view now adopted in the principal case.
A. S. B.
SUBSEQUENT VALIDATION OF AN ILLEGAL MARRIAGE
A man who had a wife undivorced entered into a ceremonial
form of marriage with another woman who did not know of
the former marriage. They cohabited as husband and wife for
many years and continued to do so after the death of the first
wife. An undivided court held that upon the death of the first
wife they would thereafter be considered as lawfully married.'
10 (909) i7o Fed. 362.
11 (1911) 192 Fed. 495.
12 [J9o5] i K B. 3o4, affirmed [iqo6] x K. B. 49.
Is Professor W. N. Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders' Individual Lia-
bility for Corporation Debts. 9 CoL. L. Rzv. 285; The Individual Liability
of Stockholders and the Conflict of Laws. 9 COL. L. Rzv. 442; 1o COL. L.
Rzv. 283; 1o COL. L. REV. 520.
' Smith v. Reed (ig6) 89 S. E. (Ga.) 8r5.
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The requirement that the parties must both be unmarried in
order to be capable of marriage is an absolute one.
2  If either
party to a marriage has a husband or wife living at the time of
the marriage, the marriage is absolutely void, however good the
faith of the parties may have been.8
The second so-called marriage being absolutely void, it follows
that it is not capable of ratification upon the removal of the
impediment. In this respect, it differs materially from a case
in which two persons entered into a ceremonial marriage and
cohabited as husband and wife, although the marriage was void-
able because one of the parties was under the age at which a
valid marriage could be contracted.4
It is reasoned, however, that the intent to be husband and wife
expressed in the invalid ceremony continues unless the contrary
appears, and the continued cohabitation after the removal of
the impediment is to be considered as under such an intent
and declaration rather than with an unlawful intent.
5 Why
such an inference is to be thus drawn is difficult to under-
stand, especially when it appeared in the principal case that the
parties had been living together as husband, and wife by force
of a ceremonial marriage to which, as a valid act, one of the
parties had never assented. Rather he consented to deceive the
so-called wife and to live with her under the appearance of
marriage. In this particular, the principal case must be dis-
tinguished from those cases in which both parties to the invalid
ceremony were wholly unaware of the existence of any obstacle
to their marriage, and manifested in good faith a matrimonial
intent.6
Other difficulties are encountered in attempting to find a com-
mon law marriage. If a man and a woman lived together as
husband and wife, holding themselves out as such and supposed
to be such by all their neighbors and relatives, a court may
well presume that they have been married; but this is a mere
2 Reeves v. Reeves (187o) 54 Ill. 332; Cartwright v. McGowan (8887)
121 Ill. 388; Tefft v. Tefft (1871) 35 Ind. 44.
C ompton v. Benham (1909) 44 Ind. App. 5,; Drummond v. Irish
(879) 52 Ia. 41; Cartwright v. McGowan, supra.
4 Smith v. Smith (1889) 84 Ga. 440.
5 Smith v. Reed (i96) 89 S. E. (Ga.) 8,5.
6 Cf. DeThoren v. Attorney-General (i876) i A. C. 686; Chamberlain
v. Chamberlain (1905) 68 N. J. Eq. 736.
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evidential presumption.7  Where, however, the connection
betiveen the parties is shown to have had an illicit origin, and
to be criminal in its nature, the law raises no such presumption.
8
The fact appearing that one of the parties had full knowledge
at the time of the commencement of such cohabitation that he
was incompetent to contract a lawful marriage would be strong
evidence that he would not hesitate to continue the unlawful
conduct after the disability had been removed."
On the other hand, why should the alleged wife be presumed
to have done a thing the necessity of which had never been
made known to her? If she regarded herself as his lawful wife
it would be a violent presumption to hold that she assented to
a second informal marriage. Without knowledge of the removal
of the impediment neither party could have intended a second
marriage, or have attempted to enter into one. Without consent
the status of marriage is never created.' 0
Presumption must yield to the superior force of direct and
positive proof. When the facts show that an apparently lawful
marriage was in fact an illicit relation in its beginning, it is pre-
sumed to be of that character, unless the contrary be proved,"
and it cannot be transformed into matrimony by evidence which
falls short of establishing the fact of an actual contract of
marriage.2
The fact that one of the parties had no knowledge of the
invalidity of the marriage, and therefore the cohabitation on her
part was not criminal, cannot validate the assumed marriage even
as to her.' If valid to her it must be equally so as to him.
S. F. D.
7 Cartwright v. McGowan, supra; Plattner v. Plattner (i905) 116 Mo.
App. 4o5; Collins v. Voorhees (igo) 47 N. J. Eq. 555.
8 Compton v. Benham, supra; Randlett v. Rice (i886) 141 Mass. 385;
Cartwright v. McGowan, supra.
9 Williams v. Williams (1879) 46 Wis. 464; Compton v. Benham, supra.
'O Dickerson v. Brown (873) 49 Miss. 357; Cartwright v. McGowan,
supra.
11 Compton v. Benham, supra; Collins v. Voorhees, supra; Williams v.
Williams, supra.
12Foster v. Hawley (1876) 8 Hun. (N. Y.) 68; Spencer v. Pollock
(1892) 83 Wis. 235; Barnes v. Barnes (1894) 90 Ia. 282; Williams v.
Williams, supra; Appeal of Reading Fire Ins. etc. Co. (i886) ii3 Pa. St.
2o4; Compton v. Benham, supra.
is Williams v. Williams, supra.
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JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS IN THE CASE
OF THE APPAM
The exercise of jurisdiction by a federal court, in the case of
the Appam,1 could not even be considered without first holding
that the State Department2 had placed the proper construction
upon Article XIX of the Treaty of 1779 with Prussia, in holding
that the Appam did not come within its provisions, both on the
ground of her being an unconvoyed prize and also of having
come into port for the purpose of permanent internment rather
than for the purpose of securing a temporary asylum. But there
is still a distinct question as to whether the exercise of jurisdic-
tion was in conformance with the general position of the United
States upon this particular phase of international law.
Article XIX of the Treaty of 1779 reads: "The vessels of
war, public or private, of both parties shall carry freely where-
soever they please, the vessels and effects taken from their
enemies, without being obliged to pay any duties, etc." A rea-
sonable interpretation of this article shows that it confers privi-
leges only upon "vessels of war."
The treaty continues as to prizes, "Nor shall such prizes be
arrested, searched or put under legal process, when they come
to and enter the ports of the other party, but may freely be
carried out again at any time by their captors to the places
expressed in their commissions." The commissions referred to
are clearly those of the capturing vessel which accompanies
prizes into port and not those of the prize crew. It is clear that
a port of refuge was not to be made a port of ultimate destina-
tion or permanent asylum. Yet the commission of the prize
master of the Appam was "to take her to the nearest American
port and there to lay her up." On arrival at Hampton Roads
application was made for permanent internment. These two
circumstances show conclusively that mere temporary asylum was
not the object of the Appam's journey.
In regard to the practice of condemning prizes in neutral ports
Sir W. Scott in the Case of the Henrick and Maria3 expressed
1 (1916) 234 Fed. 389.
2Letter of Secy. Lansing to Count von Bernstorff, March 2, i916.
3 (1799) 4 C. Rob. 35, per Sir W. Scott: "Abundant instances are to
be produced from the older edicts of England, France, Holland, and
Spain, directing that prizes should be brought into the ports of the
captor and in a late instance in the practice of this court, where a decree
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his regret that the English Court of Admiralty had gone too far
in extending its practice of condemning captured vessels in the
ports of allies to the condemnation of prizes in neutral ports, but
that he was not inclined to recall the rule to its proper purity.
No claim was made that the Appam was a war vessel; and as
private property and subject to prize she must be taken to a
prize court of the belligerent country.4  The title of the captor
between himself and the owner is inchoate and incomplete and
circumstances like a violation of neutrality5 may arise in which
the title may never become vested.6
Our own court has held7 that complete title does not vest in
the captor until the prize is condemned in a court of the captor's
nationality." The authorities for a period sustained the view
that the courts of the neutral country were without jurisdictionY
But this position is no longer held since the decision in the case
of The Betsey' ° to the effect that a district court may award
restitution of property claimed as a prize of war by a foreign
power.
It is clearly established in Dana's note to Wheaton that the
rights1 ' of a belligerent vessel of war do not extend to the
had passed on a prize ship taken by stress of weather to Norway, the
court rescinded the decree declaring that it would not condemn a vessel
lying jn a neutral port." See The Herstelder (1799) I C. Rob. 96: "I
think I may state the better opinion and practice to have been that a
prize should be brought infra praesidia of the capturing country, whereby
being so brought, it may be considered as incorporated in the mass of
national stock. The greatest extension that has been allowed has not
carried the rule beyond the places of security belonging to some friend
or ally in the war who had a common interest."
4 The'Nassau (1862) 4 Wall. (U. S.) 634; see also The Manila Prize
Cases (19o2) 188 U. S. 254.
5 Moore, Digest, see sec. 1302.
8 The Resolution (1781) 2 DalI. (U. S.) i.
7 The Adventure (I811) 8 Cranch. (U. S.) 221.
8 Queen v. Chesapeake (1863) 1 Oldr. (N. S.) 769.
9Moxon v. The Fanny (1794) 2 Pet. Adm. 3o9; see also The Ship
Friendship (1793) Bee. Adm. Rep. 40.
10 (794) 3 Dall. (U. S.) 6; Paquete Habana (1899) 175 U. S. 677.
11 Wheaton, International Law (1866) 1 n. 187: "After such examination
as the commander of the cruiser can make, his duty as against neutrals is
to decide between two courses. He must either release the vessel abso-
lutely with her cargo, papers, passengers and all entire; or he must com-
plete his capture, make her a prize and send her in for adjudication.
He cannot take a middle course, and, releasing the vessel, exercise any
belligerent authority over her cargo, papers, passengers, etc.; or take
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pursuance of such a course in the making of prizes as occurred
in the principal case.
The admission of armed ships of a belligerent whether men-
of-war or private armed cruisers, with their prizes, into terri-
torial waters of a neutral for refuge, whether from chase or
from perils of the sea, is a question of mere temporary asylum,
accorded in obedience to the dictates of humanity, and regulated
by specific exigency." Wheaton shows in the case of The
Bergen Prizes's that the right of the United States to send prizes
into Danish ports was grounded on necessity arising from stress
of weather. It nowhere appears that permanent asylum was
sought for these vessels.' 4
Inasmuch as the bringing of the Appam into Hampton Roads
was in violation of our neutral rights, 5 and of our established
policy, as shown by our rejection of Article XXIII of the Hague
Convention' relative to giving asylum to a prize, restitution was
rightfully made to the original owners." This was done by
virtue of the res itself being within the control" of the District
Court of Virginia, and of its general jurisdiction as a district
court to take cognizance of questions of prize,' 9 exclusive of
German prize court proceedings. 0  G. S.y. JR.
from her persons or property. If he should take this course he will
be considered as having declined the exercise of the only belligerent right
neutral nations will permit to him. . . . The modern practice of neutrals
prohibits the use of their ports by prizes of belligerents except in cases
of necessity."
2 Cushing, Atty. Gen. (1855) 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 122.
's Moore, Digest, sec. 1314.
'4 Wharton, International Arbitrations, p. 4572.
15 Queen v. Chesapeake, supra.
16 (19o7) Articles of Hague Convention, xxiii.
1L'Invncible (1816) 1 Wheat. (U. S.) 238; see also The Divina
Pastora (I819) 4 Wheat. (U. S.) 52: President Jefferson to Mr. Gallatin,
Aug. 28, 18oi: "Before the British treaty no stipulation stood in the
way of permitting France to sell her prizes here, and we did permit it
but expressly as a favor, not as a right. . . . These stipulations admit
the prizes to put into our ports in cases of necessity or perhaps convenience,
but no right to remain if disagreeable to us and in no case to be sold."
To the same effect see Mr. Pickering, Secy. of State, to Mr. Adet, May
24, 1796, 1 Am. State Papers, Foreign Relations, 651; also, Mr. Clay, Sec'y.
of State, to Mr. Obregon, May 1, 1828. Ms. Notes to Foreign Legations
IV, 22.
8 Jvando v. Taylor (1818) Fed. Cas. 7558.
J9 The Amy Warwick (1862) Fed. Cas. 341; Sasportas v. Jennings
(i795) 1 Bay. 470.
20 The Santissima Trinidad (822) 7 Wheat. (U. S.) 283.
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DELIMITATION OF THE STATE POLICE POWER AS TO BUILDING
RESTRICTIONS
In a recent Minnesota case' the court held-two judges dissent-
ing-that a city ordinance, adopted under legislative authority
of the state, prohibiting the erection of any store on one's own
land within a precribed residential district was an unreasonable
exercise of the police power and an invasion of property rights
secured by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion. There seems to be no former decision directly in point2
but many analogous where certain more limited classes of build-
ings -have been forbidden. All have generally held such restric-
tions valid.8
The only limitation upon the exercise of the broad police
power is that it shall not specifically be repugnant to the Federal
or State Constitutions. 4  There is no doubt that its scope extends
to protection against fire,5 unsanitary conditions,8 vice and
immorality,7 or any nuisance per se.' Furthermore it is now
well settled that it may be invoked to prohibit certain businesses,
under some circumstances, not nuisances per se.9 The general
welfare is a fundamental object to be accomplished by the
exercise of police power, and it would seem that it might well
require the exclusion of anything but residences proper from
the residential portions of a city. The characteristic architecture,
as well as the operation of business, materially depreciates the
value of adjacent property for residence purposes. The average
citizen rightly prefers his home removed from the noisy industrial
I State ex rel. Lachtman v. Houghton (1916) 158 N. W. (Minn.) ioi7.
2 That most nearly the same is People v. City of Chicago (1913) 261
Ill. 16, where a city ordinance forbidding the erection of retail stores
in a residential section was held invalid, but the ground of decision. was
that the ordinance was not authorized by state statute.
a In re Montgomery (1912) 163 Cla. 457; Hadadieck v. Sebastion (9,5)
239 U. S. 394; Ex parte Quong Wo (1911) 16i Cal. 22o; People ex rel. v.
Village of Oak Park (1915) 266 Ill. 365.
4State v. Goodwill (i889) 33 W. Va. 179; Knight etc. Co. v. Miller
(igog) 172 Ind. 27; Mugler v. Kansas (1889) 123 U. S. 623.
5 Wadleigh v. Gilman (1835) 12 Me. 403.
0 Commonwealth v. Roberts (I892) 155 Mass. 281; Walker v. Jameson
(1894) 14o Ind. 59.
7 State v. Williams (igoi) 16o 333; L'Hote v. New Orleans (1899)
51 La. Ann. 93.
9 Ex parte Quong Wo, supra; People ex rel. v. Oak Park, supra.8 Davenport v. Richmond (i886) 81 Va. 636.
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activities of the city where he can obtain better light and air and
more moral surroundings for his family. To allow a property
owner to devote his land to a use thus incongruous with that
of the immediate vicinity might even be said to damage his
neighbor's realty.10 Whether this be so or not, the ordinance
under consideration would seem to be justifiable on principle;
but the apparent weight of authority is in accordance with the
view of the majority judges in the principal case.",
L. W. B.
30 See People v. City of Chicago, supra.
"3 Willison. v. Cooke (1913) 54 Col. 320; People v. Murphy (igog) 195
N. Y. 126; Haller Sign Works v. Physical Culture Training School (gii)
249 Ill. 436; Bryan v. Chester (i9o5) 212 Pa. St. 259; Varney & Greene
v. Williams (igog) 155 Cal. 318.
